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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – VOTER REGISTRATION  
 
Summary 
 
The Court considered whether NRS § 293.805, which prohibits compensation 
based on the number of voters registered, violated the First Amendment. Further, the 
Court considered whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
First, the Court determined that a “less exacting” standard of review is applicable 
for NRS § 293.805. Under this review, the Court concluded that the statute does not 
violate the First Amendment, as the State’s interest in preventing voter registration fraud 
is a substantial regulatory interest that justifies the per-person registered payment ban. 
Lastly, the Court concluded that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Between August and September 2008, Amy Busefink, supervisor at the 
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Inc. (ACORN), approved and 
implemented a new incentive plan that paid a $5 bonus to its voter registration canvassers 
in Las Vegas if the workers returned twenty one or more voter registration applications. 
Under this plan, several ACORN workers earned the $5 bonus. 
 
Meanwhile, during an investigation regarding voter registration complaints 
against ACORN, the Secretary of State’s office discovered the incentive program and 
subsequently charged Busefink, ACORN, and ACORN’s field director for Nevada with 
violation of NRS § 293.805(1) .
2
 During the preliminary hearing, the State provided 
evidence demonstrating that ACORN had paid the bonus to several of its workers and 
that some workers submitted fraudulent applications. In a motion to dismiss the 
complaint, Busefink argued that NRS § 293.805(1) is unconstitutionally vague and 
violates the First Amendment. The district court denied this motion and later sentenced 
Busefink to one year in the Clark County Detention Center and a $4,000 total fine. This 
sentence was later suspended, and Busefink received an informal probation and a 100-
hour community service requirement. Busefink appealed the District Court decision. 
 
Discussion 
 
Justice Gibbons wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court sitting in a three-
justice panel. The questions before the Court were (1) whether NRS § 293.805 prompts a 
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  NRS 293.805(1) states “[i]t is unlawful for a person to provide compensation for registering voters that is 
based upon: (a) [t]he total number of voters a person registers; or (b) [t]he total number of voters a person 
registers in a political party.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.805(1) (2007). 
strict scrutiny standard of review or a “less exacting” standard; (2) whether NRS 
§ 293.805 violates the First Amendment; and (3) whether NRS § 293.805 is 
unconstitutionally vague.  
 
 Because the appeal was a constitutional challenge to a statute, the Court reviewed 
the case de novo.
3
  
 
I.  NRS § 293.805 prompts a “less exacting” standard of review 
 
“More flexible” and “less exacting” standards of review apply when reviewing 
the constitutionality of voting regulations.
4
 A court must “weigh the ‘character and 
magnitude’ of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those rights against the interests the 
State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State’s concerns 
make the burden necessary” when analyzing whether a state election law violates the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
5
 A state law imposing a “severe burden” on 
these rights is subject to strict scrutiny. Where the state law imposes a “lesser burden,” it 
is subject to a less exacting review, and a state’s “important regulatory interests’ will 
usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”6 
 
The United States Supreme Court in Meyer v. Grant held that a state’s blanket 
ban of compensating petition circulators violated the First Amendment because it 
ultimately limited the ability of a petition becoming an issue on a ballot.
7
 Several courts 
have subsequently held that laws that ban payment of petition circulators on a per 
signature basis are subject to strict scrutiny.
8
 Here, the Court disagreed with this 
interpretation because the restriction at issue deals with voter registration canvassers 
rather than petition circulators. Consequently, the burden on speech is less severe for 
voter registration payments than for petition circulation payments. Further, the restriction 
issue here is not a blanket ban on payments for voter registrations, but only on a per-
person-registered payment system.  
 
The Court found similarities between § NRS 293.805 and a statute analyzed in 
Prete v. Bradbury where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held a similar per-signature 
payment prohibition did not severely burden First Amendment rights as petition 
circulators could employ other manners of payment.
9
 Similarly, the law here restricts 
only one type of payment and leaves the door open for other manners of payment. Thus, 
NRS § 293.805 should be analyzed under a “less exacting” standard of review as it does 
not place a severe burden on First Amendment rights. 
 
II. NRS § 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment as the State’s interest in 
preserving the integrity of the election process justifies the restriction 
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  Because NRS § 293.805 is subject to a “less exacting” standard of review, the 
Court subsequently analyzed whether the State has an “important regulatory interest” to 
validate the restriction. As mentioned above, the Court first determined that NRS 
§ 293.805 causes minimal harm to voter registration activities as there are other payment 
schemes possible under the statute besides a per-person payment scheme.  
 
Second, the Court found that the State has an important regulatory interest in 
preventing fraud. Other courts have recognized incentives to commit fraud exist within 
commission-based payment schemes.
10
 The legislative history surrounding § 293.805 
indicates the Legislature was attempting to curb fraud.
11
 In addition, the Secretary of 
State’s office submitted evidence that ACORN had returned fraudulent voter registration 
applications. Because the possibility of fraud is genuine, the State has an important 
regulatory interest in preventing voter-registration fraud. Thus, the Court concluded the 
State’s interest in preventing fraud is amply substantial to justify NRS § 293.805’s 
minimal burden on First Amendment rights. 
 
III.  NRS § 293.805 is not unconstitutionally vague 
 
Busefink argued that the word “register[]” in the statute is vague and does not 
include voter registration canvasser activities. In its analysis, the Court looked at a word’s 
“well settled and ordinarily understood meaning”12 and also “every reasonable 
construction . . . in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”13 The Court 
determined “register” is not vague as the dictionary definition is “[t]o enroll formally or 
officially.”14 Voter registration canvasser activities such as helping individuals complete 
a voter registration application fit within the definition of register.  
 
The Court disagreed with Busefink’s reliance on a proposal by the Secretary of 
State to amend the statute to specifically define activities of voter registration organizers 
and restrict a per-person registration payment scheme as evidence of vagueness.
15
  The 
Court instead held the proposal would have delivered superior clarity to an already clear 
statute.  
 
The Court also disagreed with Busefink’s argument that the term “based upon” is 
unconstitutionally vague in that it prohibits compensation based upon any consideration 
to the number of persons a worker registered. Similar to the interpretation of “based 
upon” in Project Vote v. Kelly, the Court held that the term is not unconstitutionally 
vague, as an employer cannot use the quantity of voter registrations in a per-person 
payment scheme.
16
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 Finally, the Court disagreed with Busefink’s argument that an intent requirement, 
which would render the statute unconstitutionally vague, is absent in NRS § 293.805. 
Instead, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that the statute has a general intent 
requirement and the statute gives adequate notice of what activities are prohibited.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court found that NRS 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment nor is 
the statute unconstitutionally vague. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment of 
Busefink’s conviction. 
